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NOTES
The Atypical International Status of the
Holy See
ABSTRACT

The Holy See, as personified by the Pope of the Roman
Catholic Church, has acquiredsignificant internationalstatus over
the centuries. In modern times it has not always been clear
whether this status arisesfrom the Holy See's status as head of the
Church or as rulerof the tiny State of Vatican City. Some view the
Holy See's unique internationalstatus as an exception to the
general rule that only states participate in international
affairs. The Holy See has acquiredsuch recognitionand authority
primarilybecause of its long-standinginvolvement in world affairs
over the last thousand years. Others disagree, however, and
particularlyobject to the Holy See's status as Permanent Observer
at the United Nations. They argue that the Holy See acts solely as
a religious authority in the United Nations, a body where
membership is supposed to be limited to independent states.
This Note discusses the possibility that anotherreligioncould
form a new, independent, internationalstate following the model
of the Holy See and the Vatican City, thereby seeking to establish
equivalent rights and authority in world affairs. The centuries-old
influence of the Holy See in world affairs is an essential aspect of
its unique status and continued authority. This Note first explores
the historical backgroundand current status of the Holy See, the
State of Vatican City, and the Roman Catholic Church. The
Montevideo Convention's definition of a "state"in international
affairs is examined and applied to the Vatican City. Next, the
considerationsrecently used by the internationalcommunity when
recognizing a new state are explored. The Note concludes that
while the Vatican City is certainly an exception to the traditional
requirementsfor statehood, no other religioncould attempt to use
the Holy See as a model for successfully gaining acceptance in
internationalaffairs.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The international status of the Holy See' has been continually
defended and attacked for centuries. The Holy See, as personified by the
Pope of the Roman Catholic Church, is thought by many to have
international authority either as the head of the Church or as ruler of
the State of Vatican City. Numerous authors have argued that the Holy
See's special status in international relations is either appropriate or
1.
The word "See" is derived from the Latin sedes, generally used to refer to the
seat or residence of a Bishop. The Pope, as Bishop of Rome, is also known as the Holy See
because of his preeminence and responsibility in the Catholic Church. See EDWARD J.
GRATSCH, THE HOLY SEE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1945-1995 ix (1997). There are three

different meanings for Holy See. It can be used to indicate the Pope, it can refer to the
other departments of Church government, or it may describe the Pope as visible head of
the Church. "Holy See" is also sometimes used to denote the spiritual organization of
papal government.
See HYGINUS EUGENE CARDINALE, THE HOLY SEE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 82 (1976).
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improper.2 While theoretical disputes continue as to the requirements
for international personality and the definition of a "state" in
international law, it is generally accepted that the Holy See does have,
if atypical, a status in international relations.3 Thus, it is clear that the
Holy See will continue to play a role in international relations.
Currently, the Holy See is considered to be the head of an
independent state, the Vatican City, and as such enjoys Permanent
Observer Status at the United Nations. 4 This Note considers the
possibility that another religion could form a new independent,
international state, and thus seek to establish equivalent rights and
authority in world affairs by following the paradigm established by the
Holy See and Vatican City. The centuries-old influence of the Holy See
in world affairs is an essential characteristic of its continued authority
and unique status. No other religion possesses this characteristic, and
any attempt by another religion to establish a similar state would not
find the international acceptance and authority enjoyed by the Holy See.
Part H of this Note explores the historical background and current
international status of the Holy See, the Vatican City, and the Roman
Catholic Church. Part III looks at the Montevideo Convention's
definition of a "state" in international relations and applies it to the
Vatican City. Part IV discusses the requirements that the international
community has recently considered essential for recognizing an entity
as a state. This Note concludes that while the Vatican City is certainly
an exception to the traditional requirements for statehood, no other
religion could attempt to use the Vatican City as a model for gaining
acceptance in international affairs.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE HOLY SEE
Before discussing the international status of the Holy See, it is
essential to examine the historical background and development of the
Holy See as a person under international law. The Holy See, Vatican
City, and Roman Catholic Church are so interrelated that they must, at
least in part, be defined in terms of each other. The Pope is
simultaneously the head of the Holy See and the absolute leader of the

2.
CARDINALE, supra note 1 (defending the unique status of the Holy See). For
a critical view of this special status, see infra note 71.
3.
Indeed, the relations between the Holy See and the Christian states formed
the original international community. See Josef L. Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in
InternationalLaw, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 308, 309 (1952).
4.
CARDINALE, supranote 1, at 264.
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Church. 5 The Pope is also the temporal 6 ruler of the State of the
Vatican City.7 When the Lateran Treaty established the State of
Vatican City in 1929, it was intended to be clearly distinct from both the
Holy See and the Roman Catholic Church. 8 The Holy See acts as the
supreme organ of government of the Church; 9 the Holy See is to the
Church what the government is to a state. 10 As such, the Catholic
Church and the Holy See are actually two entities that must not be
confused. 1 ' In both the Church and the Vatican City State, the Pope is
the absolute leader in religious, administrative, diplomatic, and political
matters. 12 The Pope is the last absolute monarch, for he exercises
unlimited power in all matters pertaining to both the Church and the
13
Vatican City.
A. The Authority of the Holy See Priorto 1929
The territorial aspects of the Holy See's power developed gradually
over the last two millennia. 14 Beginning with bequests of land, the
recognition of the Church as a corporate body by the Roman Emperor
Constantine in 395 AD served to increase the wealth of the Holy See. 15
After crowning Charlemagne the Holy Roman Emperor, the Papal lands
gained powerful protection. 16 During the tenth and eleventh centuries,
the Ottonians held practical control over the Pope's territory, even

5.

According to the Code of Canon Law:

The bishop of the Church of Rome [the Pope], in whom resides the office given in
a special way by the Lord to Peter, first of the apostles, and to be transmitted to
his successors, is head of the college of bishops, the Vicar of Christ and Pastor of
the universal Church on earth; therefore, in virtue of his office he enjoys supreme,
full, immediate and ordinary power in the Church, which he can always freely
exercise.
1983 CODE c.331.
6.
"Temporality" refers to civil or political authority, as distinguished from
spiritual or ecclesiastical power. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1214 (1988).
7.
GRATSCH, supra note 1, at 99.
Id. "Vatican City and the Holy See are distinct entities, both recognized
8.
internationally as such and subjects of international law; they are united in an
indissoluble manner in the person of the pope, who is at once ruler of Vatican City and
head of the Roman Catholic church." See Gant, infra note 19, at 16.
CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 85.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 84.
11.
12.
AvRo MANHATTAN, THE VATICAN IN WORLD POLITICS 29 (1949).
13.
Id. "[The Sovereign Pontiff, ruler of the Vatican City State, has full
legislative, executive and judicial powers." JORRI C. DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES: SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD 377

(1996).
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
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though he remained theoretically supreme. 17 After this period the Pope
was periodically threatened with attack, but it was not until 1807 that
Napoleon I of France invaded the Papal States.1 8 By this time the Papal
States included a large part of central Italy, including the city of Rome. 19
Napoleon annexed the entire Papal States in 1809.20 A period of
international uncertainty with regard to the Pope and his status as a
temporal sovereign followed, until the Pope was returned to Rome in
1850, this time under the protection of Napoleon III of France. 21 The
French troops were withdrawn in 1870, however, and the territorial
22
sovereignty of the Pope was once again threatened.
From the Eighth Century until 1870 the Pope had almost constant
rights of temporal sovereignty23 as a head of state.24 In addition to the
Pope's spiritual authority as the head of the Roman Catholic Church, 25
the Pope was also the monarch of the substantial territory of the Papal
States. 26 On September 20, 1870, an Italian army occupied Rome, and
Italy annexed the Papal States. 27 Since the Pope could no longer be
considered a territorial sovereign, the status of the Pope became known
28
as the "Roman question."
Italy, itself a predominantly Roman Catholic nation, was forced to
create a position whereby the Pope could retain his importance as head
of the Church.2 9 The Law of Papal Guarantees, enacted by the Italian
parliament on May 13, 1871, provided that the Pope could retain free use
of the Vatican and the Lateran palaces.3 0 The person of the Pope was
sacred and inviolable, and any offense against the Pope would be treated

17.

Id.

18.
At that time the Papal States consisted of the present Italian regions of
Romagna, Marche, Umbria, and the Patrimony of Saint Peter, including Rome. Several
attacks, especially from French kings, occurred before Napoleon's successful invasion in
1807. Id.
19.
See Richard W. Gant, The Holy See in International Relations 1 (1986) (Ph.D.

dissertation, Pontifica Universitas Lateranensis). In 1859 the territory of the Papal State
covered 17,218 square miles in central Italy and had a population of well over three million
people. CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 99.
20.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 375.

21.
The Pope fled to the Kingdom of Naples in 1848. Id.
22.
Id.
23.
"Sovereignty" is defined as "the self-sufficient source of political power, from
which all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a state,
combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign
dictation" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
24.
See Gordon Ireland, The State of the City of the Vatican, 27 AM. J. L,'Tr
L 271,
271 (1933). "[Rielations between the Church and the various States have existed from

time immemorial." CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 76.
25.
26.

Id.

27.

See Gant, supra note 19, at 1.
Id. at 2.

28.
29.

Id.
Id.

30.

See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 375.
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in the same manner as an attack on the King of Italy. 31 The Holy See
retained aspects of sovereignty, as the Pope's consent was required to
enter the otherwise inviolable territory of the Vatican. 32 In addition, the
Pope retained freedom of communication and full authority to send and
receive diplomatic missions in the name of the Holy See. 33 Pope Pius IX
and subsequent Popes, however, were never satisfied with the Law of
Guarantees. They protested by objecting to any Catholic sovereign who
visited the King of Italy and remaining within the Vatican territory at
all times, never stepping foot onto other Italian soil. 34 The Pope retained
his spiritual authority as head of the Church, but his temporal
35
sovereignty had been terminated.
The tension between the Holy See and Italy grew to be intolerable
and was not resolved until the Lateran Treaty in 1929. The Holy See,
however, held a special position in the international community long
before the Lateran Treaty was signed. 36 Since the early Middle Ages,
the Pope had taken part in the international community based upon his
spiritual sovereignty as head of the Church, not necessarily tied to any
notion of temporal sovereignty with respect to a specific territory. 37 The
Holy See demonstrated this status by its existence and operation in
international law as the personification of the Church, where it
negotiated agreements and treaties with other international subjects. 38
The Holy See also continually exercised the right of legation,
commissioning persons to exercise diplomatic functions with the
39
governments of other states on behalf of the Holy See.
The 1815 Protocol of Vienna recognized papal diplomats as having
the same rank as ambassadors from other states under general
international law. 4 0 While the Papal State, as a party under general
international law, came to an end when Italy annexed the territory, the
Holy See retained its status under international law after 1870.41
Following the Italian annexation, the Holy See continued to conclude
concordats and other diplomatic agreements, and a majority of states

31.
32.
33.
34.
territorial

See Gant, supra note 19, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Ireland, supra note 24, at 271-72. The Pope never ceased claim to his
rights in the former Papal States until the signing of the Lateran Treaty in

1929. CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 100.

35.
In rejecting the Italian attempt to solve the "Roman question," the Pope "felt
like a prisoner in the Vatican," even if that imprisonment was self-imposed. See
DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 376.
36.

CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 83.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kunz, supra note 3, at 310.
Id. at 311.
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42
respected the Holy See's authority to send and receive ambassadors.
State representatives to the Holy See included not only the Catholic
states, such as France and Spain, but also Protestant states such as
Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland, and Greek Orthodox states
43
including Russia, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
The function of Foreign Minister for the Holy See is exercised by the
Cardinal-Secretary of State. 44 In the late 1880s Pope Leo XIII acted as
a mediator in a conflict between Germany and Spain, and the Holy See
4
arbitrated a border conflict between Haiti and Santo Domingo in 1895. 5
Russia solicited the Holy See's support for a project in the Hague Peace
Conference in 1898.46 During World War I, a vessel flying the flag of the
Holy See was declared to be a neutral state vessel. 47 Italy opposed
admitting the Holy See as a Member to the League of Nations, but the
1919 German project expressly provided that the Holy See could be a
Member. 48 The respect accorded the Holy See during the period which
it possessed no temporal authority demonstrated that the Holy See
49
remained a person under general international law.

Following the Italian annexation of the Papal States, the Pope was
deprived of the territorial aspects of his sovereignty.5° Yet the Holy See
remained an international person as a representative of the Church,
whose universal character transcended the territorial confines of any
single state and was not dependent upon the nationality of the Church
members. 51 Even after the Italian annexation the Holy See continued
to enjoy unchallenged authority with both Catholic and non-Catholic
heads of state, as demonstrated by the acceptance of papal diplomats
and continued calls for the Holy See to act as an arbiter or mediator to
52
help settle international conflicts.
B. The Holy See and the 1929 Lateran Treaty with Italy
The Lateran Treaty signed on February 11, 1929, by Italian leader
Benito Mussolini and the Holy See's Secretary of State, Cardinal
Gaspari, defines the current status of the Holy See.5 3 By ceding to the
Pope a small amount of territory, Italy reestablished the Holy See as a

42.
Id.
43.
The British monarch Edward VII visited the Holy See in 1903. as did Woodrow
Wilson, the President of the United States, in 1919. Id. at 312.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
See Gant, supranote 19, at 4.
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temporal sovereign in the world. 54 The Lateran Treaty created the City
of the Vatican, consisting of 106 acres over which the Holy See has full
property rights and exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction, with Italy
promising not to interfere in the affairs of the City. 55
The Holy See demonstrated its international capacity by negotiating
50
and signing the Lateran Treaty that created the State of Vatican City.
The Treaty was founded upon the presumption that the Holy See
possessed international personality. 5 7 In Article II of the Treaty, Italy
expressly acknowledged this aspect of the Holy See's sovereignty as "an
attribute inherent in its nature, in conformity with its tradition and with
the requirements of its mission in the world."58 It has been argued that
the Lateran Treaty cannot truly be considered an international treaty
because it was concluded by one sovereign state, Italy, and the Holy See,
who became a subject of international law only by virtue of the
agreement. 59 As discussed in the previous section, however, the Holy
See retained its international personality even during the period from
1870-1929 when it possessed no territory. The Holy See and Italy, each
international subjects, agreed to create the State of the Vatican City,
60
with the Holy See immediately identifying itself with that new state.
The Holy See's diplomatic efforts in the international community
are disproportionate to the size of its territory. 6 1 By establishing a legal

54.
See Ireland, supra note 24, at 273. This temporal power ensured the Holy
See's independence from other states and facilitated the religious tasks of the Holy See
in the international arena. See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 376.
55.
See C. G. Fenwick, The New City of the Vatican, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, 373
(1929). Article II of the Lateran Treaty states: "[t]he sovereignty of the Holy See in the
international field as an attribute inherent in its very nature, in conformity with its
tradition and with the exigencies of its mission in the world .... Article III recognizes,
"in the Holy See the full proprietorship and the exclusive and absolute power and
sovereign jurisdiction over the Vatican, as at present constituted ... creating for such
purpose the Vatican City." Herbert Wright, The Status of the Vatican City, 38 AM. J. INT'L
L. 452, 452 (1944).
56.
Id.
57.
See Kunz, supra note 3, at 312.
58.
CARDINALE, supra note 1, app. 2 at 320.
59.
Gant, supra note 19, at 23 (refuting this argument).
60.
The Holy See was still in a position to enter into engagements in the name
of the new state, because it was something more than an organ of the new
state, it was the very person of the state, and at the moment when the
Treaty was concluded, which was also the moment at which it came into
force, the existing legal person-the Holy See-identified itself with the
person of the new state, and in this capacity it was in a position to become
party to the Treaty and to assume obligations and acquire rights of a state
character.
Id. at 24-25 (quoting MARIO FALCO, THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE HOLY SEE BEFORE AND
AFTER THE LATERAN AGREEMENTS 26-27 (1935)).
61.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 376. This is clearly demonstrated by the role
the Holy See played in recent UN conferences. While the Vatican City's territory is only
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order and treaty relations with a larger neighboring state, the Holy See
possesses temporal authority within the Vatican City, in addition to its
actions on the world stage. 62 This once again demonstrates the unusual
status of the Holy See, due in no small part to its unique historical
background.
C. The Holy See's Role in the United Nations
The United Nations was founded in the wake of two World Wars to
promote the peace and security of all nations, to secure the recognition
of human rights, and to further social progress and higher standards of
living.63 The Holy See views the United Nations as a reflection of the
unity and solidarity of the human race because the United Nations has
admitted most nations to its membership. 64 The Holy See and the
United Nations have maintained close and frequent contacts, 65 with the
Holy See sending representatives to the United Nations at its
headquarters in New York, as well as the headquarters of various UN
agencies in Geneva, Rome, Paris, Vienna, and elsewhere. 66 During the
early years of the United Nations, the Holy See was sometimes referred
to as the Vatican City. 67 In a 1957 exchange of letters between the
Secretary of State of the Holy See and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, it was determined that the Holy See, rather than the
Vatican City, would maintain relations with the United Nations.68 This
designation gave the Holy See a much greater interest in the activities
of the United Nations and its agencies.6 9 The Holy See may take part
in activities involving moral, humanitarian, or social issues, in addition
to the temporal or territorial concerns tied more directly to the Vatican

about one hundred acres and its population is less than one thousand people, the Holy See
greatly affected the conference results which have global effect. See infra Part H.C.
62.
Id.
63.
GRATSCH, supra note 1. at ix.
64.
Id. at x. On July 11, 1963, Pope Paul VI gave a speech during an official visit
by U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations. During the speech the Pope
compared the universality of the Catholic Church in the spiritual sphere to the
universality of the United Nations in the temporal sphere. See CARDINALE, supra note 1,
at 230.
65.
Pope Pius XII was deeply interested in the United Nations at its creation in
1945. Unofficial contacts between the Holy See and the United Nations continued until
official contact was established in 1964. Id. at 231-32.
66.
Id. at 230.
67.
DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 405.
68.
Id.
69.
Papal representatives to the United Nations under the title of the State of the
Vatican City would have unduly stressed the temporal aspect of the Pope's sovereignty,
not reflecting his role as spiritual leader of the world.wide Catholic Church. CARDINALE,
supranote 1, at 257.
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City. 70

Unlike other states, the participation of the Holy See in the
71
United Nations is of a fundamentally religious and spiritual nature.
The Holy See is represented at the United Nations, but in what
capacity? It is not clear whether the Holy See would be eligible for full
membership in the United Nations due to the tiny size of the Vatican
City. 72 Membership in the United Nations is limited to states with
certain capacities, and the Holy See has avoided asking for a UN
acknowledgment that the Vatican City is such a state. 73 In addition to
questions regarding statehood, there are several obstacles to full UN
membership for the Holy See, given its special nature. 74 The Holy See
leads the Catholic Church, which is well represented throughout the
world population. 75 It would be difficult for the Holy See to adopt a
position against any one state, yet this is exactly what UN Member
States are compelled to do. 76 The Holy See would most likely be forced
to abstain from voting on a frequent basis. 77 It has been argued that
under Article XXIV of the Lateran Treaty, the Holy See would not be
capable of endorsing sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. 78
The Holy See established itself as a Permanent Observer to the
United Nations on March 21, 1964. 79 In 1967 the Holy See established
an Observer in Geneva for the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, the
UN Conference on Trade and Development, the UN Industrial
Development Organization, and the World International Labor
The Holy See's status as a Non-Member State
Organization. °
Permanent Observer means that while the Holy See is not one of the
Member States of the UN General Assembly, it is still considered a
state.8 1 At UN-sponsored international conferences, the Holy See is

70.
As the supreme authority of both the Church and the Vatican City, it is the
Holy See's responsibility to determine whether its representatives act in the name of the
Holy See, the Vatican City, or both. Id.
71.
See Yasmin Abdullah, Note, The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State
or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1835, 1843 (1996).
72.
GRATSCH, supra note 1, at 11.
73.
Id. 'Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peaceloving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and... are able and willing
to carry out these obligations." U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 406.
74.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. UN membership would directly involve the Holy See in political, economic,
and commercial conflicts arising between the states. See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 259.
77.
See DUURSMA, supranote 13, at 406.
78.
Id. Article XXIV of the Lateran Treaty states, "[tihe Holy See, in relation to
the sovereignty it possesses also in the international sphere, declares that it wishes to
remain and will remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between States and to
international congresses held for such object .... CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 326.
79.
See Gant, supra note 19, at 87.
80.
Id.
81.
To a large degree a non-Member State participates in the work of the United
Nations on the same level as other members. See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1839.
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given the same privileges as other Member nations.8 2 Non-Member
State observers have no vote at the UN General Assembly or other UN
committees, but these observers may attend and participate in these
83
meetings just as others states' parties.
Even though the Holy See's status as a Non-Member Observer at
the United Nations means it has no vote in the General Assembly, the
Holy See has substantial power to affect the work that takes place
during UN conventions.8 4 UN conferences are high-profile events and
establish the framework by which nations will work to meet global
objectives.8 5 At the recent International Conference on Population and
Development held in Cairo in September 1994 the Holy See had great
influence on the results reached by the convention. In the months
leading up to the conference the Holy See sought to persuade heads of
state to support its position on contraception and abortion. 80 The
demands of the Holy See were persuasive, and a consensus could not be
reached without its support.87 Public statements by the Holy See that
the "future of humanity" was at stake forced the Secretary General of
the Cairo convention to make clear the convention was not seeking the
legalization of abortion, but the prevention of illegal abortion.8 8 At
preparatory committee meetings before the convention began, the Holy
See was one of a few objectors to the many sexual rights and
reproductive health references in the draft document. 89 At the Holy
See's insistence approximately ten percent of the draft document dealing
with reproductive health and abortion remained in "square brackets"
before the conference began.9 0 During the conference itself, the Holy See
continually objected to any language referring to safeguarding abortion
rights. 91 Since UN conferences prefer to operate by consensus, where all

82.

Permanent Observer status provides the Holy See with certain privileges with

the United Nations and its subsidiary organs. Id. at 1837.
83.
Observers are nearly on the same "footing" with Members. Id. at 1839 (quoting
R.G. SYBESMA-KNOL, THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 39 (1981)).
84.
Id. at 1844.
85.
At these conventions countries from around the world discuss global problems.
Id. at 1844-45.
86.
Id. at 1845.
87.
The Holy See's participation on an equal basis with other states gave it the
unilateral power to prevent consensus. Id.
88.
In response to the Holy See's claim that there was an increasing international
acceptance to abortion on demand, Naris Sadik, the convention Secretary General stated,
"[w]e are not recommending the legalization of abortion; in fact, we are trying to fight

illegal abortion, to prevent it." Id. at 1846.
89.
The Holy See objected to over 100 references to such rights for fear that the
term implied abortion. Id. at 1848-49.
90.
Id. at 1849. Material placed in "square brackets" is not included in the final
draft of Convention documents.
91.
To help reach a consensus the other 170 state participants at the convention
agreed to include language desired by the Holy See: "[]n no case should abortion be
promoted as a method of family planning." Id. at 1850.
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states agree to the final document, 92 the other parties accepted many of
93
the Holy See's demands.
The Holy See received great criticism for the harsh tactics that it
employed during the Cairo conference. 94 Perhaps in response to this
criticism, the Holy See sought to lower its profile during the Fourth
World Conference on Women that took place in Beijing in 1995. 9 5
Nonetheless, the Holy See applied international pressure before the
conference began, was actively involved in the preparatory meetings,
and lobbied intensely during the conference itself. 96 Once again, the
Holy See objected to language referring to matters of abortion,
97
contraception, and other issues of reproductive health.
As a Non-Member Observer at the United Nations, the Holy See has
considerable power to influence the work accomplished at UN
conferences, despite having no vote in the General Assembly or other UN
organizations.9" In an effort to achieve consensus, the preferred method
of operation at these conferences, other states were willing to accede to
some of the Holy See's demands. 99 Thus, Observer status is not a token
granted the Holy See; this designation yields actual power in world
affairs.' 0 0

III. THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION DEFINITION OF STATEHOOD
While an increasing number of non-state actors are changing the
field of international relations, the state remains the critical player in
international law and the international community. 01' Many authors
argue that the Holy See cannot be a state, and, therefore, its
international status is improper.' 0 2 Given the importance of states in
international relations it seems logical to assume that the state has been

92.
Id. at 1851.
93.
Id.
94.
'The Roman Catholic Church, claiming the prerogatives of a secular state, is
working to feverishly heap its anti-abortion doctrine upon a gathering of nations." Id. at
1850-51 (quoting DeWayne Wickham, Why Let the Pope DictatePopulation Policy?, USA
TODAY, Sept. 7, 1994, at llA).
95.
Id. at 1852.
96.
Id. at 1852-53.
97.
Id. at 1854.
98.
Id.
99.
At the Cairo and Beijing conferences, the Holy See was the only state objecting
to the draft documents. Id.
100.
Id.
101.
See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and
its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 403, 403 (1999).

102.
Kunz argues that the Holy See should not be a member of the United Nations,
because it is not a state. See Kunz, supra note 3, at 313. Abdullah also finds that the Holy
See does not meet the requirements for statehood. See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1867.
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clearly and completely defined. This is not the case, however. 10 3 Great
volumes of academic and political effort have failed to generate a
10 4
standard definition for the state that is universally accepted.
A commonly referenced statement of the requirements for statehood
was set forth in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. 10 5 Those who argue
the Holy See cannot be a state commonly refer to this definition.'0 G One
advantage to selecting this definition is that, at least on its face, it
appears to provide a concise list of requirements that are easily
ascertainable.10 7 Since critics of the Holy See's statehood often use the
Montevideo definition, it will be useful in examining the Holy See under
its criteria.
The Montevideo requirements are: (1) a permanent population, (2)
a clearly defined territory, (3) operation of an effective government over
the extent of that territory, and (4) a displayed capacity to engage in
international relations, including the ability to fulfill international
treaty obligations.1 0 8 These requirements are also used by the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
as defining a "state' in international law.' 0 9 If this is an accurate and
complete definition of statehood, application of these requirements to the
Holy See may be problematic.
A. The Populationof the Vatican City
The Montevideo Convention requirement of a permanent population
is problematic when applied to the Vatican City. According to Article IX
of the Lateran Treaty, the Vatican City population is made up of those
persons who have at least permanent legal residence in the City.110
Approximately 500 people reside in the Vatican City, of whom 165 have
citizenship in the Vatican.'
Under international law there is no set
11 2
minimum number of inhabitants required to constitute a state.

103.
Numerous attempts at a formal definition for the "state"either unsatisfactorily
define the concept or have otherwise failed to gain widespread acceptance. See Grant,
supranote 101, at 403.
104. Id.
105.
Id.
106.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107.
See Grant, supranote 101, at 414.
108. Id.
109.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1986), in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND IMATERIALS

242 (3d ed. 1993).
110.
See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 107. "The population of a State comprises all
individuals who, in principle, inhabit the territory in a permanent way." DUURSMA. supra
note 13, at 117.
111.
Id. at 374.
112.
1I at 117. "No reservations have been made by the international community
with respect to the limited number of nationals of Micro.States, even if the nationals were

outnumbered by foreign residents." Id. at 118.
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The population of the Vatican is different than the population of any
other state. 1 13 Traditional notions of nationality for a population are
based upon either jus soli (bond of the soil) or jus sanguinis (bond of
blood). 114 Vatican law never speaks of nationality, however, only
citizenship. 1 15 Citizenship in the Vatican is based on jus officii, where
that status arises from the person's office. 116 The population of the
Vatican City is made up almost entirely of persons who reside there
117
because of their Church office, such as dignitaries, officials, and staff.
Thus, the population of the Vatican City, who are citizens there only
during the course of their employment within the Vatican walls,
presupposes that very few people, if any, will be permanent Vatican
citizens.1 8 This status does not foreclose the permanent establishment
of a population in the Vatican, even though it does mean that a
permanent succession of generations will not be established there. 119 In
addition, every resident, whether they are a citizen of the Vatican City
or not, may be expelled from the Vatican territory at any time. 120 This
power demonstrates that the Holy See does not see the population of the
Vatican City as a fixed entity upon which the authority of the Holy See
is based. 121 The formation of the Vatican City sought to provide a fixed
territory to assure some level of temporal sovereignty for the Holy
12 2
See.
While Vatican citizenship is extended to the immediate family of
citizens authorized to live with the citizen, 123 this provision simply does
not apply to most residents in the Vatican. 124 The majority of Vatican
citizens are Church officials who are celibate clergy or members of
religious orders, residing in the Vatican only during their term of
office. 12 5 The Vatican population is incapable of self-perpetuation,

113.
114.
115.
116.

See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 107.

Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.

117.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1862. Vatican citizenship is related to the
obligation determined by regular employment and permanent residence in the City. See
CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 108.
118.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 412.
119.
Id.

120.

Id.

121.
The Lateran Treaty implicitly recognized that there would be no fixed
population in the Vatican City. The City was created for the special purpose of assuring
the Holy See as an independent sovereign in the international community. Concerns
regarding a fixed population were secondary to this over-arching goal. Id.

122.

Id.

123.
The spouse, children, parents, and siblings of a Vatican citizen are also citizens
as long as they live with that citizen. The permission of the Holy See is required for each
person desiring to reside in the Vatican City. See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 108.

124.
125.

See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1862.
Id.
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making it "very different from that of other States." 126 Yabdullah argues
against the statehood of the Holy See based in part on the Vatican's lack
of a self-perpetuating, permanent population. 12 7 Perhaps the only true
member of the Vatican's "permanent" population is the Pope himself. 128
The population of the Vatican City is engaged in the service of the Holy
See and is incapable of maintaining and reproducing itself, but this does
not mean that it is not a population. 129 The population of the Vatican
may cause it to fail the "permanent" requirement of the Montevideo
Convention, however, because it lacks a "human society stably united in
130
its territory."'
B. The Territory of the Vatican City
A defined territory is the second requirement for a state in the
Montevideo definition. 13 ' At just over 100 acres, the Vatican City is
approximately one-fiftieth the size of Monaco, previously the smallest
independent state. 132 The boundaries of the Vatican City were precisely
indicated in a plan annexed to the Lateran Treaty. 133 Italy recognized
the full sovereignty of the Holy See of the Vatican City proper, as well
as granting the Holy See full proprietorship in several church structures
near the Vatican City so that the there was sufficient physical space to
fulfill the duties of governing the Catholic Church.13 4 While
geographically insignificant, the territory of the Vatican City is
important from a religious, cultural, and historical point of view. 135
Italy and the Holy See recognized that territory was essential for
political sovereignty because "the world . . . recognizes no form of
sovereignty other than the territorial form."1 3 6 Both Italy and the Holy

126.

See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 107.

127.
See Abdullah, supranote 71, at 1862-63.
128.
Every inhabitant of the Vatican City, whether a citizen there or not, can be
expelled from the Vatican territory at any time at the Holy See's discretion. See DUURS.%tA.
supra note 13, at 412. Even if the Vatican City had no other inhabitant than the Holy See,
sitting as simultaneous head of the Church and government of the Vatican City, the State
of the Vatican City would still be considered a state for special purposes under the Lateran
Treaty. See id.
129.
Id.
130.
The Vatican population may not be "within the meaning of the criteria for
statehood!' Id
131.
Grant, supranote 101, at 414.
132.
Ireland, supra note 24, at 273.
133.
Wright, supranote 55, at 452.
134. Full proprietorship in the additional structures is not as extensive an authority
as the "absolute power and sovereign jurisdiction" the Holy See possesses over the Vatican
City proper. Id. at 453.
135.
Id.
136.
DUUPSMA, supra note 13, at 411. Unlike most states, the territory of the
Vatican City is more important than the population in meeting the elements required for
statehood. See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 106.
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See agreed that even a minimal territory for the Holy See would provide
an international basis for statehood, 137 and no other state "ha[d] ever
made a reservation concerning the territorial element of the State of the
Vatican City.' 138 Some scholars have argued that the Holy See is not
eligible for Membership in the United Nations because its tiny size was
incapable of obtaining statehood, and only states could be UN
members. 139 It has never been shown, however, that the territorial
requirement for statehood include some minimal amount of territory.
Tiny size alone does not mean the Holy See cannot be a state. 140 The
Holy See, through the Vatican City, clearly possesses a defined territory
and satisfies this Montevideo requirement for statehood.
C. The Government of the Vatican City
The requirement of a government has been called the central
criteria for statehood. 14 1 When examining a government for purposes of
determining statehood, the degree of effective control must be
examined. 142 General international practice looks to maintenance of law
and order. 14 3 The Holy See is seen to be a true form of government over
the Vatican City. Despite the lack of a permanent population in the
Vatican City, the Holy See exercises effective temporal power over its
144
inhabitants and employees.
Here, again, the Holy See as a governing entity is unique because
it is both the absolute monarch of the Vatican City, as well as the
supreme head of the Roman Catholic Church. 145 Article III of the
Lateran Treaty recognized the full possession, exclusive and absolute
power, and sovereign jurisdiction the Holy See has over the territory of

137.
Cardinale finds this territory "morally necessary" to assure the Holy See's
freedom of action, unfettered from control by any national government. CARDINALE, supra
note 1, at 105.
138.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 411.
139.
The Holy See could not be admitted because of its "exiguity." See Kunz, supra
note 3, at 313.
140.
It is essentially agreed that territory need not be extensive, and "there is no
territorial minimum required of a state." Grant, supra note 101, at 436.
141.
Government is the essential requirement, "on which all other criteria
depend." DUURSMA, supranote 13, at 118.
142.
Id.
143.
New states seem to need more effective control over a territory than
established states, unless the previous sovereign granted the right to govern, or the new
government was established under principles of self-determination. Id.
144.
'The governmental institutions of the Vatican City exercise effective authority,
within their own legal framework." Id. at 413.
145.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1864. The Holy See possesses supreme
legislative, administrative, and judicial power over the Church, in addition to being the
absolute head of the Vatican City government. See Ireland, supra note 24, at 281.
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the Vatican City.14 6 The Pope has delegated his authority to various
organs to oversee the government of the Vatican City.147 Executive
powers within the territory are exercised by the Governor of the Vatican,
who is directly and exclusively responsible to the Pope.1 48 The Governor
also plays a legislative role, with authority to publish rules and
regulations for carrying out the laws of the state, as well as granting
permission for residence in the state. 149 The Pontifical Commission for
the Vatican City State conducts the technical affairs of the Vatican City,
such as postal and medical services, the radio system, and central
150
security.
The Roman Curia, with its numerous divisions and departments, is
the central administration of the Roman Catholic Church. 51 One
definition of the "Holy See" denotes the Pope together with the Roman
Curia. 52 In addition to its authority over the spiritual affairs of the
Church, the Curia also conducts foreign affairs and relations with
international organizations on behalf of the Holy See. 153 It is perhaps
surprising that the branches of the Vatican City government entrusted
with temporal authority over the territory do not conduct the relations
of the Vatican City with foreign states. Instead, the Holy See conducts
these duties through the Roman Curia, the governing body of the
Church. This intermingling of authority demonstrates that there is no
clear distinction between the governments of the Vatican City and the
Roman Catholic Church. 5 4 If the government of a state must be the
body that conducts foreign affairs on behalf of the state, the government
would be the Roman Curia, rather than the Pontifical Commission.' 5 5
Yabdullah argues that the Holy See could not be considered a
government because the Holy See directed a religion, rather than a
nation, with a population capable of asserting statehood.' 56 This
distinction is not overly essential for a determination regarding

146. Article I of the Fundamental Law of the Vatican City grants the Holy See "full
legislative, executive, and judicial powers" CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 110.
147.
Id.
148. Id. at 111.
149.
Id.
150. See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1865. If the Governor is absent, the
Commission may exercise its legislative authority. See CARDINALE, supra note 1,at 111.
151.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1865.
152.
See CARDINALE, supranote 1, at 82. The Roman Curia, when included in the
definition of the Holy See, includes the Secretariat of State, nine Congregations, three
Secretariats, and three Tribunals. Id. at 133.
153.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1865.
154. Id. Duursma, however, draws a distinction between the Holy See and the
Vatican City government. The Pontifical Commission is not included in the Roman Curia,
and it cannot be considered part of the Holy See. If the State of the Vatican City were to
cease, so would the Vatican City government, with the exception of the Pope and Secretary
of State, who are part of the Holy See. See DtURSMA, supra note 13, at 387.
155.
See id.
156.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1865.66.
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statehood, however, because the Holy See exercises his absolute
authority through the Roman Curia over spiritual matters and the
57
Pontifical Commission over temporal matters of the Vatican City.'
Here, again, the Holy See is the simultaneous leader of the worldwide
Church and also the monarch of the Vatican City. In this dual role the
Holy See constitutes a valid government over the territory of Vatican
City.
D. Capacity to Engage in InternationalRelations
Under the Montevideo Convention, the capacity to enter into
relations with other states is a prerequisite to statehood. 158 This
criterion has received great scrutiny, and several authors have argued
that capacity is a consequence of statehood, rather than a condition of
statehood. 159 Nevertheless, the Restatement (Third) still includes
capacity as a requirement for statehood. 160 Analysis of the capacity
requirement actually hinges upon a determination that a state is
independent. 161 The capacity of the Holy See, therefore, will be
examined by its relations with other states, as well as its independence.
1. Relations with Other States
The Holy See has repeatedly demonstrated both the desire and
capacity to enter into international relations. An important aspect of
sovereignty is the power of legation; if the international community in
general does not accept a state's diplomatic representatives, that state's
capacity to enter into international relations must be questioned. 162 The
Holy See currently enjoys full diplomatic relations with over 150
163
nations.
Further evidence of the Holy See's desire and capacity to enter
international relations is seen in the great number of agreements to
which the Holy See is a signatory. The Holy See has entered into many
agreements regulating various aspects of warfare, including becoming

157.
See id.
158.
See Grant, supra note 101, at 434.
159.
This position has been advanced by James Crawford and Ingrid Detter. One
treatise goes so far as to declare capacity "not generally accepted as necessary." Id.
160.
"An entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own constitutional
system, to conduct international relations with other states, as well as the political,
technical and financial capabilities to do so." HENKIN ET. AL, supra note 109, at 249
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 201 cmt. e).
161.
Crawford is quoted as saying "[i]ndependence is the central criterion of
statehood." Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1866.
162.
See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 73.
163.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1866.
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a party to the International Atomic Energy AgencyY6 The Holy See
also signed numerous international agreements concerning intellectual
property, diplomatic relations, and methods of international
165
communication.
The Holy See is a Contracting Party to both the Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees in 1951 and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child of 1989.166
The Holy See made Reservations to the
Conventions that their requirements and protections would only apply
as long as they were compatible with the special nature of the State of
Vatican City. 167
No state objected to
the Holy
See's
168
Reservations.
The Holy See's status as a Contracting Party, with full
rights to enter the Conventions and attaching Reservations, indicates
that the other Parties accorded the Holy See equal status with other
states.
2. Independence
The capacity to enter into international relations for the purpose of
determining statehood may also involve a determination of the
independence of a potential state. 16 9 International relations might
simply be an indicator of the independence of a state, making
independence the essential requirement. 70
A state must be
independent
to
prove
that
it
can
lead
a
separate
17x
existence.
Independence in this context actually refers to an
independent government, 7 2 but how is this determined? One famous
formulation is that an independent government possesses within its
territory "the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other
State, the functions of a State." 73
Any substantial limitation of a
government's sovereignty to a second state leads to a loss of
174
independence and, therefore, statehood.
It has been argued that the Vatican City fails the independence
requirement of statehood because it was established in the service of the

164. The Holy See is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Gant, supra note
19, app. 1 at viii.
165.
The Holy See is a signatory to the World Intellectual Property Organization.
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and a member of the Universal Postal
Union. Id.
166.
See DUURsMA, supra note 13, at 383.
167.
Id.
168.
169.

170.
171.
supranote
172.
173.
174.

Id.
See Abdullah, supranote 71, at 1866.

Id.
A state should not merely be a "continuation of another state." See DUURSMA.
13, at 120.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. (quoting Arbiter Huber in the Island of Palmascase).
Id.
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Holy See. 175 The independence requirement was meant to distinguish
one territorial entity from another; this is not the concern with the Holy
See. 176 The Holy See coincides in part with the temporal government of
the Vatican City, but both reside in the territory. 17 7 The Holy See
conducts foreign affairs on behalf of the Vatican City. There have been
cases in the past where a state transfers control of its foreign relations
to another state.17 8 The tiny state of Liechtenstein transferred control
of its foreign relations to Switzerland, but it was still deemed to meet the
statehood requirement for admission to Statute of the International
Court of Justice. 179 If Liechtenstein remained a state after transferring
control of its foreign affairs to Switzerland, an internal influence upon
the Vatican City such as the Holy See cannot diminish its independence
80
for purposes of statehood.'
The independence of the Vatican City may also be examined with
regard to Italy, given that the Vatican City is entirely surrounded and
greatly dependent upon Italy for numerous essential services. Under
Article IV of the Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized that it could not
interfere in any way in the Vatican City, and there is no authority
within the Vatican City other than the Holy See.' 8 ' The piazza in front
of St. Peter's Basilica, while within the territory of the Vatican City, is
to remain open to the public and subject to Italian police
jurisdiction.18 2 Italy pledged to demolish certain structures and not to
permit new buildings to overlook the City.' 8 3 The Vatican possesses its

own currency, but Italy mints this currency for the Vatican. 8 4 Both
states freely accept the currency of the other.' 8 5 Italy agreed to provide
punishment for those crimes committed in the Vatican City. 18 6 Italy
also ensured that the Vatican City was adequately served by water,
telephone, and postal services.' 8 7 Given the total lack of any industrial

175.
Id.
176.
The Holy See is neither a state nor a territorial entity. Id.
177.
Id.
178.
See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 249 n.1.
179.
Liechtenstein was a party to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case
known as The Nottebohm Case in 1955. Id. Article 34, § 1 of the ICJ statute states that
"[o]nly states may be parties to cases before the court." LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., BASIC
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, THIRD EDITION

127 (1993).
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 414. Article IV states, "[t]he Sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction
which Italy recognizes to the Holy See implies that there cannot be any interference
whatsoever on the part of the Italian government, and that within Vatican city there will
be no other authority other than the Holy See." CARDINALE, supranote 1, at 320.
182.
Ireland, supra note 24, at 273.
183.
Id. at 274.
184.
Id. at 277.
185.
Id.
186.
See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 120.
187.
Id. at 121.
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activities within the Vatican City, 188 it is totally dependent upon Italy
for all food and physical goods consumed by the City.189
The Vatican City is closely tied to Italy by both necessity and
consent. Although the size and actual purpose of the Vatican City mean
that it can never be self-sufficient, it remains an independent state, even
if that independence must be qualified. 190 The Lateran Treaty did not
pretend to create a completely independent state within the city of
Rome. Still, the Vatican City has demonstrated sufficient independence,
especially when the international community acknowledges that the
Holy See has the capacity to take part in international relations. While
it is perhaps debatable, the Vatican City appears to meet the capacity
requirement for statehood under the Montevideo Convention.
Analysis of the Holy See and the State of the Vatican City with
respect to the Montevideo definition of statehood does not lead to one
absolute conclusion. While it cannot be denied that the Vatican City
possesses a population, it is debatable whether that population may be
deemed "permanent," as required under the Montevideo Convention. At
just over one hundred acres, the Vatican City is one of the smallest
sovereign territories in the world, but that territory satisfies the second
Montevideo requirement of statehood. The government of the Vatican
City is certainly unique, but the Pope and the various agents to whom
he delegates authority govern the territory in all temporal matters. The
Vatican City is not subject to any undue influence from an external
authority, therefore, it possesses a government meeting the third
requirement of the Montevideo Convention. Finally, the capacity to
engage in international relations has repeatedly been demonstrated by
treaties entered into by the Holy See and the Holy See's presence at the
United Nations as a Non-Member State Permanent Observer. The
fourth Montevideo requirement for statehood is thus satisfied.
Given the unusual nature of the Vatican City's population, the
statehood of the City cannot absolutely be determined under the
Montevideo Convention's definition of a state. It can be argued that the
Vatican City either meets or fails the population requirement of the
Convention.

188. Commercial activities within the Vatican City are limited to "the sale of
souvenirs and stamps and revenues from the Vatican museums." DUURSMA, supra note
13, at 375.
189.
See Abdfllah, supranote 71, at 1867.

190.

In practice Italy does not exercise any substantial control over the Vatican

City. See DUURSMA, supranote 13, at 415.
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IV. IS THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION THE ESSENTIAL
DEFINITION OF STATE?

Within the international community the state has long been
considered the principal actor, despite the increasing importance of other
actors such as liberation organizations, non-governmental authorities, and
multinational corporations. 19 1 A clear and wholly satisfying definition of
a "state," however, does not exist. 192 Perhaps the most widely-accepted
definition is that embodied in the Montevideo Convention of 1933,193 but
there are other definitions and different methods of interpreting even
Montevideo. 194 Given that the Holy See, as sovereign of the State of
Vatican City, does not fit neatly into the Montevideo description of a state,
could another entity likewise achieve acceptance as a state without meeting
those requirements? Determining whether the Montevideo definition of
state remains the modern view therefore requires consideration of the
historical background leading up to the Montevideo Convention, as well as
an analysis of recent trends in international law.
A. HistoricalRequirements for Statehood
The Montevideo Convention of 1933 section entitled On the Rights
and Duties of States proposed four criteria for statehood. 195 As
previously stated, the four criteria are a permanent population, clearly
defined territory, effective government over that territory, and the
capacity to engage in international relations. 19 6 The origins of these
criteria, however, are found within the text of the Convention. 197 The
content of the Montevideo definition is a restatement of the prevalent
198
ideas at the time they were written.
In the Eighteenth Century it was believed that the existence of a
state was founded on its internal sovereignty. 199 Thus, statehood did not

191.
192.
193.

See Grant, supranote 101, at 403.
Id.
Id. In his book The Creation of States in InternationalLaw, James Crawford

termed Article 1 of the Convention the "best known formulation of the basic criteria for
statehood."

JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 414

(1979).
194.
See generally id. (discussing alternative views of statehood regarding
territorial control and sovereignty).
195.
Id. at 413-14.

196.

Id. at 414.

197.
Id. The academic literature of the 1930s and 1940s does not explain why the
Montevideo draftsmen chose their particular phrasing. Id. at 416.
198.
The criteria were so accepted at the time that few contemporary observers
thought to inquire into their basis or origin. Id.
199.
DUURSMA, supranote 13, at 110.
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require recognition by other states.200 As this positivist theory based on
the obligation to respect international law on the consent of individual
states gained influence, statehood became increasingly dependent on
international recognition. 20 1 By the turn of the Twentieth Century, this
view of statehood developed into a constitutive theory wherein statehood
acquired exclusively through recognition by other states. 20 2 This theory
did not permit arbitrary or discretionary acts of recognition; therefore
certain objective criteria were accepted as to how statehood should be
examined. 20 3 At this time, Franz von Liszt declared that independence
and supremacy over a territory were indispensable requirements of
statehood. 20 4 Georg Jellinek, writing in the late Nineteenth Century,
required a territory, a people, and a government for recognition as a
state. 20 5 Acceptance of these objective requirements for statehood
indicated that the recognition of a state failing to meet these criteria
would be invalid. 20 6 If recognition could be invalid, then the constitutive
theory failed to explain the true basis of statehood. 207 The failure of the
constitutive theory gave support to the more objective, declarative theory
of statehood. 208 The majority of scholars now accept the declarative
theory of the state, under which the international personality of a state
209
is only determined by objective criteria of international law.
The declarative theory of recognition has found widespread support
in state practice.2 10 The four-part test set out in the Montevideo
Convention, establishing objective criteria only, thus reflects the
declarative theory of statehood. 21 ' There is an advantage to such a
succinct and seemingly simple definition of a state. 212 Many sources,
including the U.S. State Department, accept this formulation as accurate
and determinative.2 13 The declarative theory of statehood is also

200.
Id.
201. A new state had to be recognized by other states because it created obligations
for existing states. Id.
202. Id. By their recognition, other states "constitute," or create, the new state. See
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 244.
203.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 111.
204.
See Grant, supra note 101, at 409.
205.
See DUURSM, supra note 13, at 111. Jellinek's "doctrine of three elements"
was to form the central core of the Montevideo criteria. See Grant, supra note 101, at 416.
206.
See DUURSMA, supranote 13, at 111.
207.
208.

Id.
See id.

209.
"Whether an entity is a State is a matter of fact, not of recognition." Id.
210.
Id. at 112. The weight of authority and state practice support the declarative
theory. See HENKIN ETAL., supra note 109, at 244.
211.
See DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 112.
212.
See Grant, supra note 101, at 414.
213.
A 1976 U.S. State Department document stated. "Itlhe United States has
traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These facts include effective
control over a clearly defined territory and population; an organized governmental
administration of that territory;, and a capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign
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reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which asserts
that although a state is not required to grant formal recognition to any
other state, it is required to
treat as a state an entity that meets the
214
requirements of statehood.
The distinction between the declarative and constitutive views of
recognition should not be overemphasized, however. 'The declaratory
effect of recognition on the international personality of a state has a
relative value." 2 15 If the international community refuses to recognize
an entity even though it satisfies the objective criteria for statehood, the
legal result for that entity is nearly the same. 216 State practice
continually refuses to accept either a right of recognition or a duty to
recognize. 2 17 Therefore, states have the discretion, for political or
alleged legal reasons, to withhold recognition from an entity that
otherwise would qualify as a state under international law. 2 18 This is a

consequence of the declarative theory of statehood. 219 The practical
effect is that otherwise legitimate but non-recognized states may have
difficulty in gaining acceptance as a member of the international
community. 220 While objective standards such as those put forward by
the Montevideo Convention are often cited as determinative of
statehood, entry into the international community as a member state,
to a large degree, still requires that other states choose to recognize an
entity and allow it to take part in international relations.
B. Recent State Practice

Recent decades have seen substantial changes in international
relations, leading to increased scrutiny of the objective criteria of
statehood, such as those contained in the Montevideo
Convention. 221 The most often studied requirement, the capacity to
enter into international relations is no longer universally indicative of
statehood. 222 Increasingly in modern times, actors other than states
have been deemed to possess international legal status and be capable

relations and to fulfill international obligations."' Id. at 415 (quoting U.S. Department of
State Press Relations Office Notice, Nov. 1, 1976).
214.
See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 244.
215.
DUURSMA, supra note 13, at 115.
216. Id.
217.
Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220.
The non-recognized states are restricted in their relations with the
international community because they cannot enter into diplomatic relations. Id.
221.
While some writers believe the Montevideo Convention's criteria are
incomplete, others argue that they are over-inclusive by incorporating non-essential
requirements. See Grant, supra note 101, at 434.
222.
Id.
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of entering into international agreements. 2 23 The rise of organizations
such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
the European Union have produced a shift in the nature of international
relations.2 2 4 The capacity to enter into international agreements, rather
than indicative of statehood, may more accurately be described as a
consequence of statehood.2 25 Since capacity is no longer in the exclusive
domain of states, 226 it is argued that it is not determinative of
22 7
statehood.
Similarly, the Montevideo element of territory has not always been
required, at least after statehood has been established. 22 8 States such
as Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, which were annexed during
World War H, were still accepted as having international status by most
of the rest of the world.229 The Allied Powers continued to recognize the
governments of these states, even after they had lost all territorial
authority. 23 0 Statehood does not disappear if the territory is occupied
and a government in exile is formed. 23 ' International personality is not
changed even if a non-territorial entity acquires control over a
territory. 232
The requirement of territory is not essential for
maintaining statehood once it is established, but territory may still be
a valid requirement for establishing a new state.
As with territory, the loss of a functioning government does not
mean that a state ceases to exist. Cambodia remains a state, although
it has lacked a functioning government in the traditional sense for some
time. 233 Similarly, Somalia continued to exist as a state, even though its
government lost all control over its territory in 1992.234 As with
territory, the Montevideo requirement of an effective government may
not, in all cases, be essential for international acceptance as a

223. Id. at 405. Competence to make treaties is part of statehood, but it is not
unique to states. Id. at 412.
224. What actually constitutes a person under international law has been
reassessed, given the increased role in international society played by such non.state
actors as corporations, political or religious parties or movements, organized interest
groups, transnational ethnic communities, and other non.governmental organizations. Id.
at 405-06.
225. Id. at 435.
226. Treaty-making competence is possessed by various entities besides states,
particularly international organizations. Id.
227. Id. at 434.
228. Id. at 435.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See DUURMA, supranote 13, at 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201, cmt. b agrees that a state does not cease to
be a state because it is occupied by a foreign power. The putative annexation of Kuwait
by Iraq in 1990 did not mean that Kuwait was no longer a state. See HENIN ETAL, supra
note 109, at 247.
232.
See DUURsMA, supra note 13, at 117.
233.
See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 247 n.2.
234.
Id.
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state. Here again, the distinction must be drawn between an entity
seeking to establish a new state, where the objective criteria might still
be required, and an existing state which no longer meets these criteria
yet maintains statehood. Some writers find fault with the Montevideo
Convention based on its inclusion of elements not universally accepted
235
as requirements for statehood.
While some argue that the Montevideo elements are not clearly
necessary for statehood, others claim that there are essential
requirements not found in the Montevideo definition. 236 "Independence"
is often cited as a necessary element for statehood. 237 Earlier in this
Note independence was examined as the underlying determination of the
capacity of a state to enter into international relations. Some authors
argue that independence is the most important consideration for a
determination of statehood. 238 Some would define independence as the
exclusion of others; the independence of a "state" might certainly be
questioned if it were formed under belligerent occupation or were subject
to substantial external control. 23 9 Making independence an essential
element of statehood, however, is problematic. Given the modern growth
of international organizations that possess substantial authority, the
absolute independence of member states may be questioned. 240 Perhaps
a distinction must be drawn between legal independence and military or
political independence. Under this distinction, military and political
alliances and organizations would not affect the legal independence of
the states included. 241 Certainly, tiny states, the Vatican City included,
are very dependent on neighboring states for certain necessities, yet are
seen to be independent by the international community. Thus, the
practical application of a requirement of independence may not be
possible with regard to establishing statehood.
Another proposed requirement for statehood might be the absence
of competing claims from a recognized "parent. '2 42 The states of federal
unions (such as the individual states of the United States) are not
considered to be international states because their central government
claims them to be a part of the larger federation. 243 The dissolution of
the Soviet Union, with its member political units achieving independent

235.
"A prevalent discontent over the Montevideo definition is that it includes
elements that are not clearly necessary to statehood." See Grant, supra note 101, at 436.
236.
Id. at 437.
237.
Id.
238.
The critical criterion for statehood is independence. Id.
239.
Id.
240.
States are increasingly becoming subordinate to international organizations.
Id. at 438.
241.
Id.
242.
Id. at 439.
243.
Id. at 440.
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status, only occurred after the central government consented. 24 4 It is not
clear what would have resulted if the central government had not given
its consent. Recognition of an entity as a state before the "parent" state
relinquished its claim could be considered a violation of the territorial
integrity of the parent. 245 It is long recognized that such "premature"
recognition would be an offense against the original state. 246 State
practice indicates that the absence of competing claims with regard to
247
an entity may be a prerequisite to establishing a new state.
A recent dispute over the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina raises the
possibility that the international community might require a claim to
statehood to arise through a popular process. 248 The crisis in Bosnia was
to be addressed by a special arbitration commission appointed by the
European Union. 24 9 While Bosnia met most of the requirements for
statehood, recognition was refused for two reasons. 250 The Bosnian
Constitution required popular sovereignty to be exercised, yet this had
not occurred, and the Serbs were given no part in the actions of the
Government of Bosnia. 251 The declaration of independence by Bosnia
was not recognized as forming a new state. 2 52 Along with Bosnia, it has
been argued that referenda within the former Soviet republics were
essential before the international community would recognize them as
new states. 253
Contemporary state practice may indicate that
establishing statehood must now occur through an exercise of the
25 4
popular will.
A democratic government is also thought by some to be a
requirement for any new state. 25 5 The international community was
reluctant to recognize Guinea-Bissau after it unilaterally declared its
independence from Portugal due to great concern regarding the

244.
Statehood of the union republics was only secure when the prior claimant to
those territorial units relinquished its claim. Id. at 439-40.
245.
Id. at 440.
246.
Id.
247.
The absence of competing claims is not an express factor in the Montevideo
definition of state. Id.
248.
Id.
249.
The Badinter Commission issued its Opinions regarding Bosnia on January
11, 1992. Id.
250.
The Bosnian declaration of independence was judged to be imperfect even
though the arbitrators determined that Bosnia met most of the requirements of statehood.
including supplemental conditions to the traditional criteria set by the European
Union. Id.
251.
Id.
252.
The Commission's Opinion suggested that a referendum of all Bosnians be held
under international supervision to determine whether it would be appropriate for Bosnia
to be recognized as a state. Id. at 441.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
255.
Id. at 442.
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governing regime's undemocratic character. 256 Before recognizing the
new republics of the former Soviet Union, the United States and the
European Union insisted they commit to democratic forms of
government. 257 Democracy is also an often-cited concern regarding the
status of the new states being carved out of Yugoslavia.2 5 8 Nonrecognition of undemocratic regimes may indicate the emergence of
democracy as an essential element of statehood. 25 9 In 1991 the United
States indicated that it would determine recognition based upon five new
requirements
in
addition
to
the
traditional
criteria
for
statehood.2 60 These new criteria included a peaceful respect for all
existing internal and external borders, support for democracy with
emphasis on the role of elections in the democratic process, as well as
26 1
full respect for the individual and the safeguarding of human rights.
Recent state practice appears to be expanding the requirements
imposed upon an entity claiming to form a new state. Just as the
Montevideo Convention once appeared to be a complete definition of
statehood, some have argued for a single method of determining when
statehood is achieved. In view of the near universality of membership
in the United Nations, some have argued that this body has become the
final decision-maker with regard to statehood. 262 Duursma, however,
disagreed that UN membership is a criterion for statehood. 263 Certain
entities are undeniably states, yet they are not members of the United
Nations. 264 The entry of Taiwan (or the Republic of China) into the
United Nations is blocked by a Chinese veto. 265 The tiny state of Nauru
has not applied for UN membership due to financial reasons. 266 Both of
these entities meet the objective criteria for statehood, yet they do not

256.

Id.
Id.
258.
Id. at 443. The guidelines imposed by the European Union regarding
recognition of new states from the former territory of Yugoslavia go well beyond the
traditional qualifications for statehood under international law. Recognition of statehood
must be "earned" by meeting the standards articulated. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note
109, at 252.
259.
See Grant, supra note 101, at 442-43.
260.
The policy was announced by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker at the
September 1991 meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 250.
257.

261.

Id.

262.
The "United Nations has for practical purposes become the collective arbiter
of statehood through the process of admission and non-recognition." DuuRSMA, supra note
13, at 111 (quoting J. DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 126 (1987)).
263. Id. at 111-12.
264. Id. at 112.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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belong to the United Nations. 267 UN membership alone, therefore,
cannot be determinative of statehood.
While the Montevideo Convention requirements are commonly
repeated, recent international practice indicates that the issue of
statehood is certainly more complicated than it might appear at first
glance. The Montevideo definition, while perhaps attractive for its
concise statement of what the law apparently is, is just one formulation
of the requirements of statehood. The emergence of non-state actors in
the international community has greatly affected the way that
international relations are conducted. In addition, state practice
increasingly looks at such considerations as independence, lack of
competing claims, use of the popular process, a democratic government,
and UN membership when determining whether a new state will be
recognized. This indicates that the Montevideo Convention is no longer
a complete definition of the requirements for statehood.
Plausible arguments can be made that the Holy See, through the
Vatican City, satisfies the objective Montevideo requirements for
statehood. The Holy See has also demonstrated its independence from
any other state. In contrast, however, the Holy See certainly does not
possess other characteristics such as the popular process, a democratic
government, or Membership in the United Nations. These non-objective
criteria appear to be gaining importance in the international community,
perhaps even rising to the level of requirements. The four criteria put
forward under the Montevideo Convention can be considered a starting
point for a determination of statehood, but state practice seems to
indicate that they are no longer absolutely determinative. The Holy See
has been considered an actor under international law for many
centuries, even though its sovereignty was very unlike any other state.

V. MAY OTHER RELIGIONS FOLLOW THE PARADIGM OF
THE HOLY SEE AND THE VATICAN CITY TO
ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL STATUS?

The Holy See's authority on the international stage has always been
controversial. In the era of strictly state-to-state relations, a state that
was firmly opposed to interacting with the Holy See could choose to do
so with minimal consequences. In recent decades, however, the United
Nations has become increasingly influential in the development of
international law, which is applicable to every state. 268 UN conferences

267.

The reasons for not entering the United Nations are not related to the absence

of statehood. Id.
268.
"The development of public international law can no longer be separated from
the United Nations. The Organization has become the most important world-wide law-
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provide an important forum for developing and articulating global goals
and norms.2 69 The Holy See continues to play an active role in the
development of international law at recent UN conferences, where it
participates in its status as a Non-Member Permanent Observer. 270 As
the United Nations continues to gain influence and authority, it is logical
to assume that a voice in UN decisions and activities will be increasingly
desirable. This presents the question whether another religion could
seek to gain equivalent influence in the United Nations and world affairs
as that enjoyed by the Holy See.
It has been argued that the status of the Holy See implies that
another religion would be entitled to privileges at the United Nations
2 71
merely by asserting control over a small amount of territory.
Abdullah suggested that if an Islamic state entered into an agreement
with a religious leader, following the model of the Lateran Treaty
between Italy and the Holy See, that religious leader could be granted
sovereignty over a designated territory, such as an area of a city.2 7 2 This
new "state-religion" could seek to establish a population, effect a
government in the territory, and then attempt to enter into international
relations. The "state-religion" would not need to seek Membership at the
United Nations, as it could take part in UN proceedings with the status
of a Permanent Observer. 273 By establishing itself as a Non-Member
Permanent Observer, the new entity would possess the same authority
as that of the Holy See. 2 74 Abdullah argued that the example of the Holy
See would make it difficult to deny the same privileges to another
275
religion following this pattern.
If the Montevideo Convention's definition of statehood was
conclusive and the only authority for the Holy See to act in international
relations was as the government of the State of the Vatican City, this
theoretical experiment might succeed. An attempt to establish such a
"state-religion" would not find acceptance among the community of
nations, however, and it would not be permitted to take part in
international relations. An over-emphasized reliance on the Montevideo

creating body." Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1841 (quoting 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INT'L LAW 280 (1983)).

269.
The importance of the agreements formulated at UN conferences should not
be underestimated. The most important forum for international lawmaking is the UN
conference. Id.
270.
See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
271.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1875.
272.
Id.
273.
Id.
274.
Id.
275.
Id. Based on this concern, Abdullah suggested that the Holy See no longer be
considered a Non-Member Permanent Observer at the United Nations. Instead, it should
be treated as a UN Article 71 Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). NGOs possess the
ability to lobby, but they have no negoiating role at UN conferences and lack the power
to block consensus votes. Id. at 1872.
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Convention's definition of statehood does not adequately explain why the
Holy See enjoys the international status that it currently possesses. It
is not merely as the government of the Vatican City that the Holy See
takes part in international relations. 276 In 1957 there was some
confusion as to whether the Pope was to be represented at the United
Nations as the Holy See, the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church, or
as the State of the Vatican City, a temporal sovereign. 277 The question
was answered by correspondence between the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and the Holy See.278 Dag Hammarskj6ld, the SecretaryGeneral, indicated that the papacy should be represented by the Holy
go
See, because, 'When I request an audience from the Vatican, I do not 279
to see the King of Vatican City, but the head of the Catholic Church."
The Holy See's representation at the United Nations is granted based on
the religious and historical character of the Holy See. The Holy See also
has temporal authority as monarch of the Vatican City. The Holy See
has demonstrated for centuries that it possesses both religious and
temporal capacities.
It is not necessary to change the Holy See's position in international
relations, however, out of concern that another religion would achieve
similar status. Once an entity has been recognized as a state, the rights
achieved by that statehood cannot easily be revoked. 280 Therefore, there
28 1
would be significant difficulties in changing the status of the Holy See.
The United Nations has treated the Holy See as a state since 1964 and
the Holy See would undoubtedly object to removing its privileges of
statehood. 28 2 Recognition by other states is of considerable importance,
especially in borderline cases. 283 The Holy See currently maintains
diplomatic relations with over 150 nations.2 84 Participation by the Holy
See in world affairs does not mean that another religion would find
similar acceptance.
The Holy See does not take part in international relations merely
because it has nominally satisfied the objective criteria put forward by
the Montevideo Convention. The unique status of the Holy See
developed over many centuries, where it was accepted by other states as
possessing international authority. The international personality of the
Holy See was not established by the Lateran Treaty, which merely
276. The Holy See was recognized to have international personality long before the
Lateran Treaty created the State of the Vatican City in 1929. See CARDINALE, supra note
1, at 83. For an analysis of the pre-Lateran status of the Holy See, see supra notes 14.52
and accompanying text.
See GRATSCH, supra note 1, at 10.
277.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 245.
281.
See Abdullah, supra note 71, at 1874.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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created the State of the Vatican City.28 5
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The Holy See bases its

international status on its religious and spiritual authority and not the
territory of the Vatican City. 28 6 The United Nations and other
organizations have taken no position on this issue, even though their
relations take place in the name of the Holy See rather than State of the
Vatican City. 287 The problem has been avoided, because the Holy See
possesses the objective characteristics of a state.2 88 States do not wish
to acknowledge that the Holy See's status is based on religious authority
289
for fear that other religions would make similar claims.
The Catholic Church developed over the centuries as a highly
organized institution, hierarchically structured, with one supreme
leader, the Pope, to whom all other members of the Church owe
obedience. 290 No other religion can make this statement as persuasively
as the Catholic Church. 291 For example, the Orthodox Churches are
subdivided into various national groups, subordinate in some ways to
territorial sovereignty, and lack an effective centralized government and
organization. 292 The same barriers to international personality apply to
the Anglican and Protestant Churches and would appear to prevent
these churches from founding a recognized "state-religion" based on the
293
model of the Holy See.

A. Judaism and Israel

The historical and hierarchical underpinnings that led to the
widespread recognition of the Holy See as a member of the international
community are not so clearly absent from other world religions, however.
With the founding of the State of Israel by UN declarations in 19471948, a secular, yet strongly "Jewish" state entered the community of
nations. 294 This new nation consists of a politically sovereign people
living within a specific territory that takes part in international
relations. 295 Israel is Jewish because of its cultural and strong national
identity, not through the secular source of its laws. 296 For this reason,

285.

See supranote 59 and accompanying text.

286.

See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 300.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
States would "not be inclined to welcome" such claims by other religions. Id.
See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See JOHN CORRIGAN ET AL., JEWS, CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS: A COMPARATIVE
INTRODUCTION TO MONOTHEISTIC RELIGIONS 434 (1998).
295.
Id.
296.
Id. at 436. While Judaism receives a special role as the ancestral faith, Jewish
rights, as well as those of other religious minorities within Israel are protected under

Israeli secular law. Id. at 435-36.
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Israel has been described as a "unique historical experiment" in
determining the boundary between religious and state law within a
secular, yet very Jewish, democracy. 297 Given Israel's strong association
with Judaism, notwithstanding the fact that it is actually a secular
democracy, the possibility that a new Judaic State could be established
and recognized by the world community is rather slim. 29 8
Israel lacks a written constitution to explicitly separate church from
state; relations between the state and Judaism have been described in
terms of four components: (1) the Jewish Sabbath and Festivals are
public holidays, (2) Kosher food is served in public institutions, (3) the
law of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance is
governed by religious institutions, rather than the secular courts, and (4)
state schools are of either separate secular or religious "streams." 299 The
interests of Judaism are often aligned with the interests of Israel, and
Jewish religious leadership now enjoys a recognized voice in national
and international problems, such as relations in peace and war, the
environment, religious tolerance, and treatment of minorities. 300 While
Israel is actually distinct from Judaism, in the eyes of many, the two are
not so easily separable. Accordingly, an attempt to form a new Judaic
State following the model of the Lateran Treaty and the Holy See would
not likely gain international acceptance. It may be argued that Israel
has fulfilled the role of a Jewish voice in international affairs. Absent a
strong historical basis for an official Jewish state, the formation of a new
Jewish nation that met the four objective criteria of the Montevideo
Convention would not be guaranteed recognition as a state by the
international community.
The world religion with the largest number of followers, Islam,
generally possesses a nationalistic character, in contrast to the
international status of Catholicism. 301 Due to the importance of national
rather than international Islamic leaders, and lacking the centralized,
hierarchical structure present in the Catholic Church, it does not seem
likely that the formation of an independent Islamic State based on the
Lateran model of the Holy See would achieve widespread international
acceptance. One fairly recent offshoot of Islam, the Bah6'i Faith,
however, may one day be able to make a plausible argument for
recognition of a new religious state on par with the Holy See.

297. Id. at 435.
298. While some Jews view Judaism as a religion, others see Jews as constituting
a nation like other nations, meaning that religion is not the real meaning of being a
Jew. See EUGENE B. BoROWITZ, UNDERSTANDING JUDAISM 99 (1979).
299. See NORMIAN SOLOMON, JUDAISM AND WORLD RELIGION 119 (1991).
300. Id. at 121.
301.
See CARDINALE, supra note 1, at 91.
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B. The Bahd' Faith
The BahA'i Faith is among the youngest of the world's distinct
religions. 30 2 The Faith is based entirely upon the teachings of its
founder, Bah4'u'llh, and arose in Iran during the mid-Nineteenth
Century. 30 3 The BahA'i Faith has now spread to almost every part of the
world, has administrative institutions in over two hundred independent
states, and has believers from every cultural, racial, social, and religious
background. 30 4 At the center of the BahA'i Faith is an emphasis of the
30 5
oneness of humankind, and the emergence of a global civilization.
What makes the BahA'i Faith unique, apart from its rapid
international growth, is its level of international organization. 30 6 The
Universal House of Justice has legislative and executive authority to
make international decisions on behalf of the Faith.3 0 7 The membership
of the Universal House is elected by the members of national spiritual
assemblies of the BahA'i Faith during an international convention held
at the World Centre of the BahA'i Faith in Haifa, Israel. 30 8 The
Universal House demonstrates its sole legislative authority over the
Faith by guiding the development of the global Bah{'i community
through propagation of global teaching plans in which other Bah4'i
30 9
agencies have carried out the roles assigned to them by the House.
Recognition of the BahA'i Faith as an established, independent
religion is demonstrated by the status accorded to it as a consulting
member of various non-governmental councils within the United
Nations. 310 By actively participating in the United Nations the Faith
has gained a forum for its universal ideals, as well as an opportunity for
the BahA'i community to participate in the formation of international
law. 3 1' Seeking to ensure that it is not perceived as a political threat,
the BahA'i community has avoided being identified with the diplomatic

302.
See WILLIAM S. HATCHER & J. DOUGLAS MARTIN, THE BAHAI FAITH: THE
EMERGING GLOBAL RELIGION xiii (1985). The Bah 'i Faith arose as a result of tensions

within Islam; the Faith is now entirely independent of its parent religion. Id. at 1.
303.
Id. at xiii.
304. Id. There are over three million Bahi'is around the world, nearly half of whom
live in India or Iran. There are, however, over 100,000 centers around the world where
Bahi'is or BahA'i groups reside. Id. at 167-68.
305.
"Bahi'u'llih's central message is that the day has come for the unification of
humanity into one global family." Id. at xiii.
306. Id. at 144.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 147.
309. Id. at 191.
310.
During the period 1974-1979 the BahA'i International Community participated
in thirty-five UN conferences, in seventy-two regular sessions of the Economic and Social
Council, and in the General Assembly special session on the study of disarmament. Id. at
169 n.3.
311.
Id. at 169.
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policies of any nation or group of nations, preferring to focus on working
3 12
through the United Nations.
The BahA'i Faith is presently recognized as an independent religion
by the international community, as demonstrated by its participation at
certain UN functions. It is not clear, however, that an attempt to
establish an independent Bah;'i State following the Lateran model of the
Holy See would presently find international acceptance. While the
Bah'i Faith does have an established international structure much like
the Catholic Church, the Faith has existed for less than two hundred
years, and its membership, though widespread, is still only a few million
strong.3 13
In contrast, the Roman Catholic Church numbers
approximately one billion adherents. 3 14 The BahA'i Faith lacks the long
history of international status enjoyed by the Holy See, as well. For
centuries, the Holy See has been recognized as having international
authority and has entered binding international agreements, as well as
helping to settle international disputes. This history has led to a general
acknowledgment that the Holy See enjoys a unique position in world
affairs. It is doubtful that the world would be receptive to a new state
created by another religion, lacking the strong historical evidence of
organized international status. While the BahA'i Faith cannot presently
demonstrate a long history of involvement in the international
community, continued participation in such bodies as the United Nations
may one day lead to a time when a BahA'i State, created following the
Lateran model of the Holy See, would find acceptance as a member state
of the community of nations.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Montevideo Convention is a reflection of the declarative theory
of statehood, whereby a state is created by satisfying certain objective
criteria. If the international community decides not to recognize an
entity as a state, even if it meets those objective criteria, however, that
entity will not be permitted to act in the United Nations or elsewhere on
the international stage. Recent state practice indicates that more will
be required of new states than simply meeting the minimum Montevideo
requirements. An agreement between a state and a religious leader
attempting to form a new state in a Vatican City format would not arise
from a popular process or contain a democratic government, which is

increasingly important to the international community.

A treaty

modeled after the Lateran Treaty would be seeking to establish a new

312.

Id. at 199-200.

313.

Three million believers is not overly large when compared with other religious

movements that are roughly contemporaneous with the BahS'i Faith. Id. at 167-68.
314.

See CORRIGAN ET AL., supra note 294, at 464.
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state, and this state would be subject to the additional, non-objective

requirements that have been recently applied to new entities seeking to
establish statehood. These criteria would not permit a new "statereligion" to gain statehood. Absent the long tradition of recognition such
as that possessed by the Holy See, another religion would not be
recognized by the international community as a state.
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